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During the last few decades, firms have increasingly committed 
themselves to global markets. This has coincided with a surge of 
activities by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), as measured by 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
1; indeed FDI flows have grown much 
faster than trade and income until 2001, when this figure reversed and 
FDI started to slow down (UNCTAD 2004).  
Globalisation has underlined the need for firms to exploit their 
Intangible Assets (IAs) on a global scale. IAs may consist either in a 
stock of goodwill – associated with product quality reputation – or in 
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1 Throughout the paper, we use the term MNE in a broad sense, calling 
“multinational” a firm that is servicing a foreign market, not necessarily through 
Foreign Direct Investment 
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superior knowledge – related, for instance, to an idea, a good customer 
relationship, a new tool, or superior management techniques.  
That Multinational Enterprises must necessarily transfer some levels 
of their Intangible Assets, while operating abroad, is close to 
definitional: an attempt to exploit promising opportunities means a 
decision concerning the nature of those assets and the methods by 
which they are to be transferred (Blair and Freeman 2004).  
Evidence shows that an industry tends to have a greater proportion of 
MNEs when its output is characterized by high R&D, marketing 
expenditures, scientific and technical workers, product innovation and 
complexity (Markusen 1995). Compared to physical assets, IAs are 
more likely to give rise to FDI firstly because they can be easily 
transferred back and forth and secondly because they enjoy a “public 
good” nature, which makes them available to additional production 
facilities at relatively low costs. Notice that the same joint-ness 
features that enable MNEs to cheaply move Intangible Assets expose 
them to the risk of dissipation
2.  
Given the great importance of IAs in orienting multinational activity, 
what are the best ways for MNEs to achieve their goals? 
The choice of the most appropriate ownership structure is a central 
issue in economic theory and a very practical question for firms 
wishing to operate abroad. 
Broadly speaking, we should recognize the existence of different ways 
of servicing a foreign market – from export to FDI, from joint-venture 
(JV) to licensing – which can be classified according to their 
knowledge transfer, from the safest arrangement of export, that 
secures knowledge inside the firm and the country where it originates, 
to the most risky case of licensing, through which knowledge is 
transferred both outside the source firm and the source country. 
Foreign Direct Investment and joint-venture represent two 
intermediate steps in this continuum, the former having knowledge 
inside the source firm but transferred outside the source country, the 
latter being characterized by the Multinational participating in final 
good production together with a local partner. 
We call Internalisation issue the decision regarding firm’s boundaries, 
namely the choice of whether to internalise or to outsource certain 
activities (Dunning 1993).  Internalising typically brings direct cost 
penalties, because an independent supplier might have better 
knowledge, expertise and cost advantage, with respect to an integrated 
firm; however, relying on the market might be risky as well, due to 
technology transfer (see, among others: Teece 1977, 1986, Rugman 
1986), informational asymmetries (Ethier 1986), moral hazard 
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reputation, dissipation comes because the local counterpart benefits form the MNE’s 
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(Rugman 1985, 1986, Horstmann and Markusen 1996), and reputation 
concerns (Horstmann and Markusen 1987b). Therefore, the 
boundaries of the firm – both domestically and abroad – are shaped by 
the trade off between the costs and the benefits of using the market 
(Coase 1937; Williamson 1985).  
While many authors mention the joint-venture across the wide array of 
feasible contracts in a foreign country (see, for instance: Teece 1977, 
Mansfield et al. 1979; Rugman 1985, 1986; Saggi 2000; 
Ramachandran 1993; Glass and Saggi 1999, 2002a), to the best of our 
knowledge, no theoretical formalisation has been offered yet, in 
assessing the Internalisation issue.  
International JVs offer the possibility to make profitable use of the 
specific capabilities of the local partner; they may facilitate 
cooperation with foreign governments, and generate knowledge that 
could be valuable in future business operations (Desai et al. 2002). 
However, these advantages are often offset by the implicit costs of 
split ownership, and the resulting inability to fully exploit certain 
resources developed by the parent firm: the risk of being expropriated 
is always inherent in such an alliance because proximity
3 to Intangible 
Assets enables the local company to expropriate the MNE’s key 
resource and start a rival firm. 
While abstracting from any reputation consideration, we are interested 
in the exact role that dissipation of knowledge – in the form of 
technology and human capital - plays in orienting the MNE decision 
of FDI versus partnering; in particular, we aim at showing that the 
integrated solution becomes more appealing the stronger the threat of 
spillover, resembling the FDI-licensing trade off, extensively 
documented in the literature (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Markusen 
1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 2001; 
Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a). In a partial equilibrium 
framework similar to (Etheir and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1999; Mattoo 
et al. 2001), we consider a Multinational Enterprise willing to produce 
in a foreign market. The MNE has to decide between two alternative 
entry modes: Foreign Direct Investment, by which production takes 
place within a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) or joint-venture with 
a local company, which is potentially appealing due to the partners’ 
complementary skills. By assumption, FDI avoids knowledge 
dissipation, but involves efficiency losses, since the local company 
has a relative advantage in input manufacturing, relative to the MNE; 
contrary, JV is efficiency enhancing, but firms retain only a share of 
total revenues and knowledge is subject to dissipation which prompts 
production efficiency. The market structure is endogenized in a two-
period, two-country model where competition in the local country 
results from a Cournot game in case of FDI and a monopoly in case of 
JV. We find that the joint-venture is always preferable, for the 
multinational, when the first period share θ, imposed by the local 
government, is large, due to the MNE’s considerable stake in the 
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partnership. Contrary, FDI always emerges, as an equilibrium 
outcome, for low values of θ since the benefit of production efficiency 
is more than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues accruing 
to the MNE. The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation comes at play 
for intermediate values of the first period share: we find that FDI 
prevails when the spillover effect is strong, while JV is chosen when 
the spillover effect is so mild that it is completely outweighed by 
production efficiency considerations. Welfare implications of Foreign 
Direct Investment and joint-venture are derived at the end. 
Theoretical priors on the boundaries of the MNE – FDI versus JV - 
are tested in the second part of the paper, by means of a new firm-
level dataset, constructed by the author. The empirical analysis builds 
on a survey questionnaire exploring the international choices of more 
than 300 Italian manufacturing companies (90% of the total) with 
production affiliates in a region of the world that we call Asia, 
including China, India and the South East Asian (SEA) countries - 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Philippines, 
South Korea and Japan. The questionnaire, structured in multiple 
choice responses, enabled us to derive detailed information not only 
on traditional variables – such as sales, employees etc. – but also on 
more subtle aspects referred to MNEs’ Intangible Assets – such as the 
employees human capital and the firm international experience – 
rarely considered in previous studies due to the lack of firm-level data. 
Probit estimates on the Italian choice of FDI versus JV in Asia match 
with our model predictions. 
This paper relates to several strands of literature.  
The choice of the topic and the specific modelling moves our analysis 
close to the theories of the Internalisation issue based on the 
Dissipation of Intangible Assets (DIA), where the risk of losing any of 
the firm’s key resources provides a motive for keeping production 
internal rather than relying on the market.
4 In Horstmann and 
Markusen (1987b), exporting, setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary 
and licensing are compared as alternative entry modes for a 
Multinational Enterprise, renowned for its product quality. In this 
framework, any licensing contract must provide the licensee with the 
adequate incentives to enhance the Multinational’s reputation: when 
providing incentives of this sort becomes too costly, the foreign firm 
decides to internalise production. In (Ethier and Markusen 1996; 
Markusen 1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 
2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a) the dissipation of 
knowledge offers a major rational for operating in wholly owned 
subsidiaries, rather than signing a licensing agreement. In this case the 
entry mode decision is driven by the extent of a spillover mechanism 
that might enable the local party to appropriate production secrets, and 
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start a rival firm: the more serious this threat, the more likely the 
integrated solution. Differently from this literature, we model the 
choice of FDI versus joint-venture - instead of licensing – based on 
knowledge dissipation. 
Our focus on human capital and technology -  as key assets that a 
Multinational Enterprise may wish to exploit in its foreign operations -  
brings this paper close to the studies on knowledge transfer costs (see 
Caves 1974; Teece 1977, 1986; Davidson and Mc Fetridge 1984; 
Ramachandran 1993; Glass and Saggi 1999). Authors belonging to 
this field assume that modern economic growth is inextricably linked 
to the successful international transfer of technology, the extent of 
which crucially hinges on the costs involved. Transfer costs are shown 
to depend on a number of transferor’s and transferee’s characteristics, 
such as the number of previous applications and the age of the 
technology, the manufacturing experience and the sales of the 
recipient party etc. Our contribution differs from these in two aspects: 
first of all, we take the point of view of the MNE, and consider 
knowledge dissipation as a negative aspect, while it is regarded as a 
source of growth in (Caves 1974; Teece 1977, 1986; Davidson and 
Mc Fetridge 1984; Ramachandran 1993; Glass and Saggi 1999); 
moreover, technology transfer is not the ultimate focus of our 
research, but rather one of the factors that eventually influence the 
entry mode decision of Multinational Enterprises. 
The great importance of Intangible Assets and their influence on the 
most appropriate organisational form is also at the hart of a relatively 
recent strand in the Theory of the Firm.  Indeed, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998; 2000; 2001), offer an interesting re-thinking of the concept of 
power, which no longer stems from ownership of physical assets – as 
in the Property Right Approach (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and 
Moore 1990) - but rather on access to critical resources. While 
adopting a similar perspective on the role of IAs in driving the 
international organisational decision, we are more interested in the 
FDI-JV trade off, than in the choice between horizontal and vertical 
hierarchies. 
Finally, our contribution relates to the empirical literature on the 
choice between WOS and JV, where the Internalisation decision is 
explained in terms of firm, industry, and country characteristics in 
discrete dependent variable-models (see, among others: Andersen and 
Gatignon 1986; Gomes Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Agarwal and 
Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1996; Buckley and Casson 1996; 
Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2002; Pan 2002; Chen and Hu 2002; 
Herrmann and Datta 2002; Brouthers 2002; Guillen 2003). While 
these papers ground on Coase (1937)’s and Williamson (1985)’s 
intuitions and qualitatively extend some DIA arguments to the case of 
joint-venture, the present contribution is intended to provide a 
theoretical formalisation of the JV option, and show that a DIA 
mechanism - similar to the one highlighted for the FDI-licensing 
choice – also drives the FDI-JV trade off. Moreover, an additional 
element of novelty comes from the dataset employed here and our   6
attempt at measuring human capital aspects beyond the broadly 
documented technological ones. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model, with particular attention to the entry mode decision 
– FDI versus JV (2.1) – and the welfare implications of these two 
arrangements (2.2); Section 3 is entirely devoted to the empirical 
analysis – data description (3.1), methodology (3.2) and Probit 
estimates (3.3); Section 4 concludes and sets the future agenda. 
 
 
2. The model 
In this Section, we present the theoretical model on the MNE’s choice 
of FDI or joint-venture (2.1) and discuss the welfare implications of 
the two contractual agreements (2.2). All the main derivations are 
included in Appendix A. 
 
2.1 The entry mode choice: FDI versus JV 
In a partial equilibrium framework similar to (Etheir and Markusen 
1996; Saggi 1999; Mattoo et al. 2001), consider a two-country - North 
(N) and South (S) - two-period -1 and 2 - model in which a 
multinational firm, located in the North, is willing to produce a final 
good in the South. The S market is populated by a single firm, which 
acts as a monopolist, and sells the same good as the MNE in N; the 
Multinational Enterprise has to decide whether to serve the foreign 
market through FDI or in joint-venture with the local firm; moreover, 
it is not possible for the MNE to change supply mode between the first 
and the second period
5. 
Final good production requires two activities: input manufacturing and 
assembling, according to a linear technology which employs 1 unit of 
input to obtain 1 unit of output. 
Notice that these steps can be performed either by the multinational 
(through its subsidiary) or by the local enterprise, but the two firms 
are not equally efficient, since the MNE has an advantage in 
processing final goods – due to its superior knowledge - while the 
other party does better in input manufacturing
6. 
To capture this idea, we assume that the per unit cost of each activity 
is zero, if it is performed by the company that has a relative advantage 
in it, and α (α>0) otherwise. 
As in (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1999; Markusen 1998, 2001; 
Mattoo et al. 2001) demand is linear in the S market; in particular: 
 
Q p − =1                                                                                             (1)  
 
                                                 
5 This option is instead considered in Markusen (1998, 2001), where the MNE can 
choose a different licensee in the second period.  
6 This assumption fits the Italian experience in Asia, presented in Section 3. Empirical 
evidence shows that Italian multinationals tend to contribute know-how and 
technology while relying on their local partner for input supply.   7
where p is the price and Q denotes the total quantity, Q = qMNE + 
qlocal
7; MNE and local stand for the multinational and the local firm 
respectively. 
As in Fosfuri (2000), we assume that firms attach equal weight to 
every period, i.e. the discount factor is equal to 1. 
Operating through Foreign Direct Investment means that the 
Multinational Enterprise keeps production within its boundaries, 
through a local subsidiary; in this case it is the same firm that 
performs both input manufacturing and assembly. So, competition in 
the S market results in a symmetric Cournot game, with marginal (and 
average) cost equal to α.  
The essence of a joint-venture agreement lays, instead, in the partners’ 
complementary skills
8: in this case, each party performs only the 
activity in which it has a relative advantage, and sales revenues are 
shared with weights θ (0<θ<1) for the MNE and (1- θ) for the local 
firm, in the first period, and θ (0<θ <1), (1- θ ) in the second period. 
To capture the restrictions that many developing countries 
governments put to foreign ownership
9, we treat θ as an exogenous 
parameter, while the MNE is free to choose θ in the second period. 
Put another way, the Multinational Enterprise has two alternatives in 
entering the S market: FDI and JV, the latter involving the additional 
choice of the second period share. If a joint-venture contract is signed, 
market S becomes a monopoly, and final good production rests with 
the joint-venture. 
Consider, first, the FDI case. Equation (2) gives the present value of 
the MNE profit when final good production is internalised (See 
Appendix A for details): 
 
2 ) 1 (
9
2
α − = Π
FDI
MNE                                                                               (2) 
 
By operating on its own, the Multinational Enterprise benefits from 
keeping entire revenues in both periods, but it entails higher costs in 
input manufacturing, compared to the local company. 
                                                 
7 Given this functional form, 0<α<1. 
8 Our modelling of the joint-venture contract is quite close to Ramachandran (1993), 
Mattoo et al. (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002a). Notice that the FDI/joint-venture 
decision does not necessarily coincide with the Greenfield/Acquisition one. In 
particular joint-ventures differ from Acquisitions because the local firm is not 
“bought” by the MNE, and the two enterprises do not “merge” into a new economic 
entity: they simply make a temporary cooperation agreement in order to produce final 
goods together. This is the reason why the local partner may deviate in the second 
period and eventually start a rival firm, as it is explained below, in Section 2. 
9 This is true for many DVCs, and for the large majority of the Asian countries in our 
sample (for more details, see: www.ice.it, www.indmin.nic.in). Moreover, according 
to the Italian experience in Asia - surveyed in this paper - it is not uncommon for 
joint-venture contract to set different shares across time.   8
Consider now the present value of the two firms’ profits under the JV 
agreement - namely 
JV
MNE Π for the MNE and 
JV
local Π  for the local firm 
















local                                                                    (4) 
 
In this case, production efficiency is achieved, but each firm retains 
just a fraction of total revenue. 
Operating in joint-venture, the two sides work very close to each 
other; this might generate a knowledge spillover from the MNE to the 
local firm during the first period: having access
10 to the multinational 
Intangible Assets – human capital and technology - the partner might 
learn about the processing procedure so that her cost disadvantage α 
drops to a lower level cα in the second period, with 0<c<1
11. 
According to our modelling, c measures the extent of the spillover 
effect, lower values being associated with higher degrees of 
knowledge dissipation. 
It follows that the local firm has the option of breaking up the JV 
contract, and start a rival firm, with the “stolen” know-how; such an 
option does not exist for the Multinational Enterprise, this asymmetry 
depending on the fact that the it has just a poor knowledge of the local 
market, relative to the partner
12. 
In case of defection – denoted by superscript d - the local firm makes 











= Π                                                                (5) 
 
while the multinational, having no other option, earns zero. 
It is clear that the MNE can prevent this defection by setting θ such 
that the local firm’s second period profit, under the JV agreement, is 
not lower that its profit in starting a rival firm, i.e.: 
 
                                                 
10 Although licensing provides a more direct channel for technology transfer - because 
the licensor has to provide the licensee with the whole set of production tools – 
working side by side in a joint-venture similarly allows the local firm to learn from 
the MNE. 
11 Notice that c is strictly greater than zero, meaning that the cost reduction, induced 
by knowledge dissipation, cannot make the local firm exactly as efficient as the MNE 
in processing final goods. At the same time c is strictly lower than 1, meaning that a 
spillover mechanism – although very weak, if c→ 1 - is always at work in the joint-
venture. 
12 In other DIA papers, this asymmetry is captured by a fixed cost incurred by the 
MNE in operating alone in the local market (see, for instance: Ethier and Markusen 
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This is the Incentive Compatibility Constraint, which yields the 
following condition: 
 
2 ) 1 ( 1 α θ c − − ≤                                                                                  (7) 
 
The multinational chooses to integrate, rather than partnering if 
FDI
MNE Π  
from (2) is greater than  
JV
MNE Π  from (3), evaluated at the incentive 
compatible value of the second period share: 
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Equation (9) gives the condition for the multinational to internalise, 
and it is solved in Result 1. 
 
 
Result 1 (See Appendix A for details) 
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In choosing between FDI and JV, the MNE trades off the benefit of 
retaining total revenues and protecting its Intangible Assets, with the 
efficiency loss in terms of input manufacturing. Such a trade off 
crucially drives Result 2: 
 
 
Result 2 (See Appendix A for details) 
i) If θ < F(α)  =
9
9 ) 1 ( 17
2 − −α
,  the Multinational Enterprise will 
always choose Foreign Direct Investment; 
ii) If F(α) < θ < G(α) =
9
) 1 ( 8
2 α −
, both arrangements may emerge, 











= c  (i.e. strong spillover effect), the 
Multinational Enterprise will choose FDI to avoid knowledge 
dissipation; if c1<c<1 (i.e. weak spillover effect)  JV will emerge as an 
equilibrium outcome; the MNE’s profit gap, between FDI and joint-
venture, increases as long as c decreases (i.e. stronger spillover 
effect); 
iii) If θ > G(α), the MNE will  always choose joint-venture;  
iv) If  1
17
3
1 1 < < = − α α , case i) never occurs. 
 
From Result 2, it is clear that the JV option is never appealing if the 
first period share, imposed by the local government, is lower than a 
threshold  F(α) (case i): in this case, the benefit of production 
efficiency is more than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues 
accruing to the MNE. The risk of dissipating knowledge plays no role 
under these circumstances, because FDI is per se attractive compared 
to a partnership in which the foreign firm has just a small stake. 
Opposite to this is the situation in which θ is greater than a threshold 
G(α) (case iii) since the MNE’s large stake in the partnership makes 
the joint-venture absolutely appealing from the point of view of 
Multinational Enterprise, despite the spillover mechanism that benefits 
the local partner. 
The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation comes at play for 
intermediate values of the first period share accruing to the foreign 
firm (case ii): when F(α) < θ < G(α), θ is not large or small enough to 
drive the MNE’s entry mode decision per se: here we see that FDI 
prevails for lower values of c (i.e. higher cost reduction for the local 
firm, induced by knowledge dissipation), while JV emerges, as an 
equilibrium outcome, for higher values of c (here the spillover effect 
is so mild that it is completely outweighed by production efficiency 
considerations). Moreover, the profit gap for the MNE, between 
operating alone (FDI) or in joint-venture, increases as long as c 
decreases, in lines with the empirical evidence of Mansfield et al. 
(1979), Mansfield and Romeo (1980). 
Therefore, we conclude that FDI, induced by the threat of knowledge 
dissipation, is more likely to emerge over JV when know-how easily 
spills over, namely for firms endowed with superior knowledge or 
operating in high tech industries. 
Notice that these priors are broadly consistent with those derived for 
licensing (see Section 1) and they match with the empirical evidence 
on the choice between joint-venture and FDI provided by (Andersen 
and Gatignon 1986; Gomes Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Agarwal 
and Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1996; Buckley and Casson 1996; 
Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2002, to mention just a few). 
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2.2 Welfare implications 
In Section (2.1) we derived the conditions for the Multinational 
Enterprise to internalise production, rather than signing a joint-venture 
agreement with a local firm (See Result 2). 
Now we want to see what the welfare implications of the two 
contractual agreements are. 
Suppose that all the agents – producers and consumers – discount the 
future the same (i.e. also consumers put equal weights to every period, 
according to our assumption in Section 2.1) 
First consider the FDI case.  
Total discounted welfare W
FDI is given by the sum of the two firms’ 









2 ) 1 (
9
8
α −                                                                                (10) 
 
Consider, now, total discounted welfare W
JV under a joint-venture 
agreement: it results from the sum of the JV joint discounted profit 






=                                                                                             (11) 
 
Result 3 (See Appendix A for details) 
W
FDI>W







JV if α3< α<1. 
 
According to Result 3, when the cost disadvantage α is low, Foreign 
Direct Investment is preferable for the whole society; when α is, 
instead, high, JV entails higher total welfare. 
Figure 1 summarizes the main findings of Result 2 – FDI versus JV - 
and Result 3 – related welfare implications – for different values of 
the parameter α. Since 0<α<1, by assumption, we restrict our 
attention to the white area. 
Result 2 gives three possible scenarios for the entry mode choice – 
case i) always FDI; case ii) FDI or JV depending on the extent of the 
spillover effect; case iii) always JV - depending on θ being lower or 
greater than the two thresholds F(α) and G(α); moreover, we know 
that case i) never occurs for α1< α<1. 
Result 3 gives the condition for W
FDI>W
JV: total discounted welfare 
under FDI is greater than total discounted welfare under joint-venture 
if 0 < α < α3. 
Since α3< α1, it is clear that for 0 < α < α3, all three cases – i), ii), and 
iii) – are feasible, and FDI is better for the S society; for α3< α < α1, 
all three cases are feasible, as before, but JV entails higher welfare 
than FDI; for α1< α < 1, only cases ii) and iii) are feasible and JV still 
involves higher welfare.   12
α 





3. Empirical Analysis 
In this Section, we test the main findings derived above and 
empirically assess the choice of FDI versus joint-venture made by 
Italian multinationals in Asia. For the purpose of the present work, a 
new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author, is employed. The 
discussion is organized in three steps: first we present the data (3.1) 
and the specification (3.2), and then we comment the econometric 




The empirical analysis developed here builds on a survey 
questionnaire
13 exploring the international choices of more than 300 
Italian manufacturing companies with production affiliates in Asia.  
Although relatively small, we believe that this sample is highly 
representative of the Italian case, since it accounts for around 90% of 
all Italian investors in the region of interest
14. 
The questionnaire, based on multiple choice responses, consists of two 
sections: first we ask background information to derive a general 
profile of the Italian investors; then we investigate the Internalisation 
issue and the major challenges faced in the destination country, for 
more than 40 questions overall. 
Additional balance sheet or industry-level data are derived from 
AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende) and ISTAT (Istituto 
Nazionale di Stastistica). 
The experiences of Italian MNEs in Asia are very diverse. An initial 
look at the survey results suggests that it is impossible to draw a single 
“Italian” profile, because investors differ in many regards. 
                                                 
13 This questionnaire, designed by the author, is an updated version of Gattai (2004). 
Interviews have been conducted between 2001 and 2005. 
14 The complete list of investors was obtained through intersection of all the available 
sources: ICE (Istituto Commercio Estero), Reprint-Politecnico, Italian Embassies and 
Chambers of Commerce in Asia. In lines with the theoretical specification, attention 



























iii)   13
If we look at the number of employees, we find that medium (45%) 
and large (29%) companies account for the largest presence in Asia, 
followed by small (25%) and handcraft (6%) ones
15; according to 
sales, 44% of the firms top 50 million Euros, 16% is between 25 and 
50 million Euros and 22% below 10 million. 
 




























Figure 2 displays the region of origin of Italian parent companies: the 
largest part of respondents comes from Lombardia (37%), Emilia 
Romagna (16%), Veneto (14%) and Piemonte (10%) while Southern 
lands account for a very limited number of MNEs with manufacturing 
affiliates in Asia. 
According to the acquisition of technology, companies can be grouped 
in four categories of technological development (Bell and Pavitt 
1993): in traditional “supplier dominated” industries – like textile, 
leather, shoes, furniture, potteries etc. – technical change comes from 
supplier of inputs, while technology is transferred in the form of 
capital goods and components; in “scale intensive” industries – like 
automobile and chemicals – technical change is generated by the 
design and operation of complex production systems; in “science 
based” high-tech industries, technology emerges from corporate R&D 
and it is heavily dependant on academic research; finally, “specialized 
supplier dominated” firms provide high performance equipment in the 
form of components, instruments or software to advance users. From 
Figure 3, we see that Italian MNEs belong to “supplier dominated” 
sectors the most (37%), followed by the “specialized supplier 
dominated” (36%), “science based” (14%) and “scale intensive” 
(13%) ones. 
Interviews reveal that firms pay large attention to the human capital of 
their employees: many of them require English (70%) and computer 
                                                 
15 Based on ISTAT classification, large enterprises have more than 500 employees, 
medium enterprises have 100-499, small and handcraft ones have 11-99 or less than 
10 respectively.   14
(94%) skills to everybody, around 40% organizes periodic training 
courses longer than 6 months and the percentage of employees 
holding a degree is higher than 25% in 43% of the cases. 
 















Experience in managing international operations seems high as well: 
many respondents have been engaged in activities abroad – from 
licensing (9%) to import/export (49%), from franchising to (4%) to 
FDI (20%) and joint-venture (18%) – in more than 5 countries (80%) 
and for longer than 10 years (77%) before the present involvement in 
Asia. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of Italian affiliates: China is the largest 
recipient region - accounting for 56% of FDI and JV establishments in 
the whole region - followed by India (17%), Malaysia (9%) and 
Thailand (6%), while Japan occupies the last position. 
 























Notice that manufacturing activities in Asia are driven by various 
purposes, depending on the destination. In particular, market access 
considerations play a major role in large countries - like China, India 
and Indonesia - but also in small ones - like Thailand, Singapore and   15
South Korea – which serve as a commercial platform to the entire 
Asian region (see Figure 5). At the same time, the low cost of labour 
provides an important rational for de-locating production in some 
developing countries like Vietnam, China, India and the Philippines.  
 
Figure 5: Investors’ purpose is establishing their affiliates in Asia, by 
country 





















Adding to this, it is worth mentioning that 45% of the goods produced 
in Asia is intended to satisfy the local demand, while 55% isexported 
abroad
16. Evidence shows that the wish to become more competitive, a 
good chance, the existence of trade barriers elsewhere or special 
incentives to foreign activity provides further reasons to open 
subsidiaries. 
Operating in Asia has sometimes turned out to be difficult for Italian 
investors whose success was eventually undermined by cultural 
distance (21%), language difficulties (16%), bureaucratism (16%), 
lack of infrastructures (11%), little transparency of the judicial system 
(10%), low skills of the local employees (10%) and corruption (6%). 
Figure 6 depicts these problems, by destination country. 
As far as the Internalisation  issue is concerned, joint-venture 
establishments (57%) prove to be the most common mode of entry 
forItalian companies in Asia. Nonetheless, FDI has been extensively 
preferred to JV in many countries, such as Singapore, South Korea, 





                                                 
16 Using the terminology of the Knowledge Capital Model (see Markusen and Maskus 
2001 for a survey), we call horizontal purpose the first case, aimed at accessing the 
local market – i.e. MNEs produce and sell within the local market - and vertical 
purpose the second one, aimed at saving on production costs – i.e. MNEs produce in 
the local market, because it is cheaper, but they sell abroad.   16
Figure 6: Problems faced in the Asian market, by country 












































The reasons to engage in a partnership, rather then operating in 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, range from gaining local support (54%) to 
risks and costs sharing (20%), from achieving the optimal size (10%) 
to skills (7%) and competitive position (2%) enhancing or law 
restrictions (8%)
17 (see Figure 8). 
According to the survey, Italian companies mainly adopt a “strategic” 
approach (49%) to select their partner - looking at her connections, 
and market expertise – followed by an “organisational” criterion 
(20%) – based on human and learning skills - a geographical (17%) 
and a “financial” (14%) one (Luo 2000). 
Negotiation regarding the terms of the agreement is usually a lengthy 
process which lasts more than one year on average and is based on the 
partners’ complementary skills, with the Asian firm contributing 
                                                 
17 See www.ice.it and www.indmin.nic.in for more details about the restrictions to 
foreign property in the countries of interest.   17
cheap labour force and deep knowledge of the local market and the 
MNE providing know-how and technology. 
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Among the 43% of respondents that operate in a WOS, a large 
majority (73%) chooses this mode in order to achieve strong control 
over technology transfer and high flexibility standards, in lines with 
our theoretical predictions: especially high tech companies are very 
reluctant to invest in developing countries since they do not want to 
share know-how with a lower skilled partner. Foreign Direct 
Investment seems the most natural way to avoid this risk, as MNEs 
simply work alone and they do not need to consult with a local 
counterpart on management decisions. For about 21% of the sample, 
the wholly-owned subsidiary represents an evolution from a former 
JV, while 6% chooses to operate alone due to the lack of an 
appropriate local partner, as reported in Figure 9. 
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Based on the data briefly reviewe d  i n  3 . 1 ,  w e  r e g r e s s  t h e  
Internalisation decision – FDI versus joint-venture – of Italian   18
multinationals in Asia, within the DIA framework sketched in Section 
2.  
Our unit of analysis is the production affiliate in Asia. The 
econometric specification is as follows: 
 
ε σ α







+ + =                                          (12) 
 
FDI is the (n x 1) dependent variable vector, whose elements take 
value 1 in case of wholly-owned subsidiary, 0 in case of joint-venture.  
Explanatory variables are of two types: F is a (nxm) matrix of Firm-
level regressors; C is a (nxk) matrix containing host Country 
characteristics; α and σ are the vectors of parameters associated to 
firm and country variables respectively, and ε denotes the error term. 
Notice that, within F, we distinguish between core and control 
regressors: core variables are those measuring Italian firms’ Intangible 
Assets
18, over which priors have already been derived; control 
variables denote other firm-level characteristics that may play a role in 
shaping the Internalisation decision. 
Recall from our previous discussion (Section 1 and 2) that knowledge 
covers both human capital and technological  aspects, so our core 
firm-level regressors refer to both types. This is an important novelty, 
compared to the previous empirical literature: although human capital 
is often mentioned as a key asset, likely to orient multinational 
activity, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt in measuring or 
including it in econometric tests has been made yet. This limitation is 
probably due to the lack of firm-level information, which poses strict 
constraints to empirical studies.  
As a proxy for technology, we employ alternative indicators, such as 
the value of patents (PATENT); the ratio of patents over sales 
(PATENT/SALES);  and, similarly to (Blomstrom et al. 1989; 
Smarzyinska 2000), whether or not the parent firm belongs to a high 
tech sector (HIGHTECH), with a particular focus on the TELECOM 
one
19. To capture the role of technological leadership, the variable 
TECH_relative is also included: it measures the overall technological 
endowment of the parent company, relative to the industry mean 
(Smarzyinska 2000).  As far as human capital aspects are concerned, 
two measures are adopted: the extent of the training courses that the 
parent firm periodically organizes for its employees (TRAINING), and 
their level of education (GRADUATE). 
All these variables refer to the consistency of the parent company’s 
Intangible Assets, so we overall expect a positive sign, basing on the 
model described before: according to our theoretical findings FDI, 
                                                 
18 Intangible assets, here, refer solely to knowledge – in the form of technology and 
human capital - as in the model described in Section 2. 
19 Notice that in earlier studies (see, among others: Desai et al. 2002; Smarzynska 
2000) R&D expenditure is also employed as a proxy for technology. Due to data 
missing we preferred to base on patents. However, R&D and advertising expenditures 
are included in TECH_relative (see Appendix B for details).   19
induced by the threat of knowledge dissipation, is more likely to 
emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when firms are 
endowed with more technology and human capital or they belong to 
high tech industries
20. Moreover, our indicators of IA are 
characterized by a low degree of correlation, meaning that they 
capture different dimensions of the firms’ key resources (see table b3 
in Appendix B). 
Firm-level control variables include: sales (SALES, as in Blomstrom 
and Zejan 1991; Meyer 1998; Smarzynska 2000); the destination of 
the goods produced in Asia (HFDI) – which allows us to distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical purposes; the importance of firm-level 
scale economies (SCALE); a proxy for the MNE’s experience in 
running foreign operations (COUNTRIES, similarly to Herrmann and 
Datta 2002; Guillen 2003), its location in Italy (VENETO) and a few 
industry controls (METAL and PRECISION). 
As far as country variables are concerned, we consider: TRADE, as a 
measure of the host market degree of openness (the same measure is 
employed also in Smith 2001; Arora at al. 2001; Smarzynska 2002); 
POP to describe the local population dimension; a property right 
index (PRI) and an economic freedom index (EFI), similarly to (Rapp 
and Rozek 1990; Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Lee and Mansfield 
1996; Smarzynska 2002); and a dummy, specifying whether or not the 
host country belongs to the South East Asian region (SEA). 
Appendix B contains more information about the variables included in 
the econometric specification, provides summary statistics of the 
continuous regressors and the correlation matrix of the core-type ones. 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable FDI, regressions are 
carried out within a Probit framework. 
 
3.3 Results 
Probit estimates are shown in Table 1. 
Reminding the theoretical priors, derived in Section 2, it is worth 
noticing that all the core variables are significant with the expected 
sign and they remain so across different specifications; this provides a 
first important result and suggests quite a good matching between the 
theory and the data
21. 
                                                 
20 For the sake of completeness, we should mention that the role of technological 
leadership – captured by the variable TECH_relative – is not so clear-cut. On the one 
hand, investors enjoying a technological lead in their respective sectors are perceived 
as more attractive JV partners by local firms and governments; therefore, they are 
more able to negotiate more favourable terms of agreement. Moreover, the 
technological gap between foreign leaders and domestic producers may be so large 
that, even in case of knowledge transfer, the threat of IA dissipation is minimal. On 
the other hand, the technology gap may not be enough to prevent knowledge 
dissipation, so investors possessing technological advantage over other firms in their 
sector may potentially incur  in greater losses from knowledge dissipation than 
investors with less sophisticated technologies. Therefore, the impact of 
TECH_relative might be positive or negative (Smarzynska 2000). 
21 This evidence is  also consistent with an explanation à la Antras and Helpman 
(2004): since foreign direct investment is a very costly mode of entry, the most   20
In particular, moving from the simplest specifications on the left – 
where FDI is regressed only on core-type variables – to the richer 
specifications on the right – where control variables are also included 
- we see that with an increase in the Italian firms’ Intangible Assets, 
the probability of internalising production, rather than operating in 
joint-venture, increases as well.  
Indeed,  HIGHTECH,  TELECOM, PATENT,  TECH_relative, 
PATENT/SALES,  GRADUATE and TRAINING all display the 
expected positive sign; this means that wholly-owned subsidiaries are 
more likely to be settled by Italian companies operating in high tech 
sectors, holding patents, being technological leaders in their respective 
field and possessing well trained and cultured employees. These 
results are broadly consistent with the existing empirical literature 
(see, among others, Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2001; Brouthers 
2002; Chen and Hu 2002) and add precious information about the role 
of human capital, as a key resource driving the Internalisation choice 
of Italian companies in Asia. 
As far as control variables are concerned, METAL and PRECISION  
turn out to be significant, with a positive sign, meaning that parent 
firms engaged with production of metal goods or precision 
instruments, watches and optical appliances have higher probability to 
operate through FDI. SALES is significant, as well, with a negative 
sign (as in Blomstrom and Zejan 1991; Meyer 1998)
22, suggesting that 
“richer” enterprises tend to share ownership with an Asian partner, 
rather than operating alone. This has probably to do with the 
bargaining power of the Italian investor: the larger the MNE, the 
stronger its position in negotiating favourable JV conditions. Not 
surprisingly, firm-level scale economies (SCALE) encourage FDI, 
since the integrated solution helps to exploit the cost advantage of 
production on a larger scale. Estimates also show that investors 
coming from VENETO are more prone to operate in wholly-owned 
subsidiaries
23, while experience in running foreign operations 
(COUNTRIES) and horizontal purpose (HFDI) push towards joint-
venture establishment. Indeed, being used to manage foreign 
operations might help to protect Intangible Assets more effectively 
and to avoid the risk of knowledge dissipation. At the same time, it is 
clear that investors wishing to penetrate the local market – horizontal 
purpose - are more likely to operate in joint-venture than FDI, in order 
to take advantage of the partner knowledge of her own country
24,  
                                                                                                         
productive firms – in terms of human capital and technology -  get engaged in FDI, 
while the least productive ones prefer to operate via joint-venture.                                                                                                
22 A different result is obtained in (Pan 2002; Chen and Hu 2002), where sales are 
shown to be positively correlated with the probability of entering a foreign market 
alone. 
23 We also checked the statistical significance of other regions of origin, but none of 
them turned out to influence the FDI/joint-venture decision. 
24 This is perfectly in lines with the questionnaire responses reviewed in Section 2.1: 
gaining local support – in terms of interacting with local authorities, marketing final 
products etc. - has proved to be the main reason for Italian MNEs to undertake JV 
projects in Asia.   21
Table 1: Probit estimates
25 
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25 Marginal effects in round brackets, P-value in square brackets. * means significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Pseudo R
2 is a typical measure for goodness of fit in discrete-dependent-variable 
models. The expression for Pseudo R
2 is 1-1/[1+2(logL1-logL0)/N], where N is the 
total number of observations, L1 is the maximum log-likelyhood value of the model of 
interest, and L0 the maximum value of the log-likelyhood function when all the 
parameters, except the intercept, are set equal to 0. P-value^ denotes the P-value of 
the joint null-hypothesis. 
 



























whereas investors aiming at producing in Asia but exporting final 
goods elsewhere – vertical purpose – do not need a local counterpart 
and better protect their assets through WOS. 
According to our data, country variables also play a role in driving the 
FDI-JV trade off. In particular, TRADE, EFI and PRI are significant 
with a positive sign, meaning that the higher the degree of openness 
and economic freedom and the lower the property right protection, the 
more appealing the integrated solution. Similar results can be found in 
(Pan 2002; Chen and Hu 2002; Smarzynska 2002). Notice that the size 
of the recipient country – measured by POP – is also significant and 
negative, namely larger countries tent to be accessed through joint-
ventures rather than wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
This is a quite plausible result, since Italian firms usually choose large 
host countries when driven by horizontal purposes, in which case they 
seek the support of a local partner. Finally, operations in South East 
Asian countries – captured by the dummy SEA – are more likely to be 




Multinational Enterprises may penetrate into a foreign market through 
alternative channels - namely export, FDI, joint-venture and licensing 
- each of them involving a different degree of Intangible Assets 
transfer from the parent to the local firms. 
While the FDI-licensing trade off has been extensively documented in 
the theoretical literature based on the Dissipation of Intangible Assets 
(see Section 1), to the best of our knowledge no theoretical treatment 
of the JV has been offered yet, within the DIA framework. 
This paper makes an attempt at filling this gap, by means of a two-
country, two-period model in which a Multinational Enterprise has to 
decide between two modes of servicing a foreign country S - FDI and 
joint-venture – each of them resulting in a different market structure 
for S. By assumption, Foreign Direct Investment avoids knowledge 
dissipation, but involves efficiency losses, since the local company 
has a relative advantage in input manufacturing, relative to the MNE; 
on the contrary, JV is efficiency enhancing, but firms retain only a 
share of total revenues and knowledge is subject to dissipation. In a 
partial equilibrium framework similar to (Etheir and Markusen 1996; 
Saggi 1999; Mattoo et al. 2001), we show that the joint-venture is 
always preferable, for the multinational, when the first period share θ, 
imposed by the local government, is large, due to the MNE’s 
considerable stake in the partnership. Contrary, for low values of θ, 
FDI always emerges since the benefit of production efficiency is more 
than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues accruing to the 
MNE. The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation thus influences 
multinational activity only for intermediate values of the first period   23
share, making Foreign Direct Investment prevail when the spillover 
effect is strong. Welfare implications of the two contractual 
arrangements depend on the cost disadvantage of the MNE: for low 
values, FDI entails higher welfare for the host country while for high 
values the opposite occurs. Notice that these predictions are broadly 
consistent with those derived for the FDI-licensing trade off (Ethier 
and Markusen 1996; Markusen 1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 
2000; Mattoo et al. 2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a), 
suggesting that a similar DIA mechanism is at play here. 
Our theoretical findings on the boundaries of the MNE are tested by 
means of a new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author through 
survey interviews. With a reply rate around 90% of the total, we 
provide evidence on more than 300 Italian firms with manufacturing 
affiliates in Asia, including detailed information on the human capital 
of the employees, beyond the firms’ technological equipment. Probit 
estimates show that Foreign Direct Investment is more likely to 
emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when firms are 
endowed with more human capital and technology, they belong to 
high tech industries, or turn out to be technological leaders in their 
respective sector. This suggests that the Italian experience is in line 
with the theoretical predictions derived in Section 2 and highlights the 
key role of human capital aspects. We believe that this is an important 
novelty, compared to the previous empirical literature since, to the 
best of our knowledge, the impact of employee skills on the 
Internalisation issue has not been tested yet, due to a lack of detailed 
data. 
Given our promising results, we believe that it is worth carrying out 
further research within the DIA field, future steps including the 
treatment of the whole array of feasible contractual arrangements - 
namely joint-venture, licensing, export and FDI – in a single model 
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Appendix A 
In Appendix A, we derive the main results shown in Section 2. 
 
A1. MNE equilibrium profit under FDI (Equation 2) 
Under FDI, the MNE and the local firm compete in a symmetric 
Cournot duopoly, with marginal (and average) cost equal to α. 




i q q q ) 1 ( α π − − − =                                                                   (a1) 
 
where i = MNE, local; j = MNE, local and i≠j. (Recall, from Equation 
(1), that the demand function is p = 1 – (qMNE + qlocal) ) 
From the first order condition, with respect to the quantity, we find 
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Considering the two-period time horizon, the present value of the 





















 is the discount factor. 
 
(a6) gives Equation (2), under the assumption that δ=0: 
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A2. MNE and local firm equilibrium profits under JV (Equations 3 
and 4) 
Under the JV agreement, the MNE and the local firm operate within a 
single company, making the S market a monopoly, with zero marginal 
(and average) cost. 
Joint profit of the two partners is: 
 
Q Q
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JV π is shared between the partners with weights θ and 
(1- θ) in the first period, θ and (1-θ ) in the second one. 
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A3. Local firm equilibrium profit in case of defection (Equation 5) 
In this case, the local company breaks the JV contract at the end of the 
first period, and starts a rival firm during the second one, by means of 
the stolen know-how. Therefore, the present value of the local partner 
profit under defection - 
d
local Π  - results from two components: her first   31
period JV profit (see A2) plus her second period monopoly profit 
(since the local firm remains the only producer of final goods in S), 
with marginal (and average) cost cα < α, due to the spillover effect. 
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The second period equilibrium profit of the local company is obtained 
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By means of straightforward substitution, Equation (5) gives the 
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A4. Proof of Result 1 
Consider Equation (9), which gives the condition for the MNE to 
internalise, rather than partnering: 
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This is equivalent to: 
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From (a16), (a17), it is clear that c1<c2. 




MNE Π > Π  - 
for
26 c>c2 or c<c1.                                                                                    
 
 
A5. Proof of Result 2                                    
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 provide useful information in order to prove 
Result 2. 
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This is equivalent to: 
 
0 9










                                                    (a19) 
 
Since 0<α<1, the Denominator of (a19) is positive, so we need to 
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9
) 1 ( 8 9 9 2 α θ − − + is positive for 0<α<1 and 0<θ<1, 
so
9
) 1 ( 8 9 9 2 α θ − − + exists and it is a real number. 
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(a20) is always verified for 0<α<1 - it is the sum of two positive 
terms,  (1-  α)  and the square root - so the Numerator of (a19) is 
positive and c2>1.                                                                                      
 
Lemma 2: c1>1   if θ < F(α) =
9
9 ) 1 ( 17
2 − −α
; 0<c1<1 if F(α) < θ < 
G(α) =
9
) 1 ( 8
2 α −
; c1<0 if θ > G(α); where c1 is given by (a16). 
 
Proof:  
Consider, first, the condition for c1>0: 
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Given that 0<α<1, the Denominator is surely positive, so we need to 
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which is equivalent to: 
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From (a23), we see that c1>0 if θ<G(α); c1<0 if θ>G(α). 
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27 If θ>G(α), then  c1<0<1; if  θ<G(α), then it makes sense to check whether c1 is 
lower or higher  than 1.   34
This is equivalent to: 
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Given that 0<α<1, the Denominator is surely positive, so we need to 
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From (a27), we see that c1<1 if θ>F(α); c1>1 if θ<F(α). 
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This is equivalent to: 
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which is always true for 0<α<1. 
It follows that: c1>1   if θ < F(α); 0<c1<1 if F(α) < θ < G(α); c1<0 if 
θ > G(α).                                                                                                
 




MNE Π > Π  - for c>c2 
or c<c1, and combine this result with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Recall 
also that 0<c<1, by assumption of the model.  
 
i) If θ<F(α), then c1>1 from Lemma 2; given that c2>1 from Lemma 
1, (9) is always true for 0<c<1 (See Figure a1: the horizontal line 
depicts values of c; the bold traits indicate the interval in which (9) is 
true; according to the model assumption, c is defined only between 0 
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This means that – in the model range for c - Foreign Direct Investment 
is always preferable to joint-venture because it provides the MNE with 
higher profits.                                                                                        
 
ii) If F(α) < θ < G(α), then 0<c1<1 from Lemma 2; given that c2>1 
from Lemma 1, for 0<c<1 (9) is verified – namely FDI entails higher 
profit than JV - for 0<c<c1 (See Figure a2):   
 
 




Furthermore notice that the profit gap for the MNE, between FDI and 




MNE Π − Π increases as long as c decreases. 
From (2), (3) and (8), we see that the profit gap equals: 
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For  0<α<1 and 0<c<1, (a32) is negative, namely a decrease in c 
(more cost reduction through knowledge spillover) increases the profit 
gap, for the MNE, between FDI and joint-venture. 
                                                                                                               
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iii) If θ > G (α),  then c1<0 from Lemma 2; given that c2>1 from 
Lemma 1, (9) is never true for 0<c<1  (See Figure a3):   
 








MNE Π < Π for 0<c<1, and FDI in never chosen.                                                    
 
 
iv)  Recall from (a28) that: -1< F(α)< 
9
8
. Case i) requires θ<F(α), but 
θ is strictly between 0 and 1 in the model so, when -1< F(α)< 0,  θ 
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Remember that 0< α<1: (a33) is true for α1< α<1. For these values of 
α, F (α) <0, so case i) never occurs.                                                                                                         
 
 
A6. Total welfare under FDI (Equation 10) 
Total welfare is defined as the sum of all agents’ welfare so, in our 
model, consumers’ welfare plus firms’ welfare. 





FDI CS w + + ≡ π π . 
Recall from Section (A1) that market S is a symmetric Cournot 
duopoly in case of Foreign Direct Investment. As a result, the foreign 
and the local firms make per period profit as in (a5) – corresponding 
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Given the equilibrium quantities (a3) and price (a4), consumers’ 
surplus CS
FDI is represented by grey triangle in Figure a4: 
 
Figure a4: Total discounted welfare under FDI 
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Under the assumption that all agents have discount factor equal to 1, 
by multiplying (2) by 4and (a36) by 2 and summing, we find total 
discounted welfare W
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A7. Total welfare under JV (Equation 11) 
Recall from Section (A2) that market S is a monopoly in case of joint-
venture, with the local firm being the only producer of final good. As 
a result, the per period total welfare w





JV π  - the dotted area in Figure a5 - and CS
JV - the 
grey triangle in Figure a5.   
Under the assumption that all agents attach equal weigh to every 
period, we find total discounted welfare W
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A8. Proof of Result 3 
To compare total discounted welfare under Foreign Direct Investment 
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Condition (a38) is verified – meaning that W
FDI > W
JV - for α < α3 or α 
> α4. 
Given that 0 < α < 1, by assumption, Foreign Direct Investment 
brings higher welfare for 0< α< α3, while for α3< α<1 W
FDI<W
JV.                                                    
                                                                     
 
Appendix B 
Appendix B contains a description of the variables included in 
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the continuous regressors (Table b2) and the correlation matrix of the 
core-type ones (Table b3). 
 
Table b1: Variables description 
Variable Description 
FDI 




Dummy variable, 1 if the percentage of employees with a 
degree, in the parent firm, is larger than 25%, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human 
capital of the parent firm. 
Source: interviews 
TRAINING  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm organizes training courses 
for the employees longer than 6 months, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human 
capital of the parent firm. 
Source: interviews 
HIGHTECH  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to a “high tech” 
sector, i.e. a sector in which the average R&D expenditure is 
more than 500,000 Euro. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology 
of the parent firm. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale 
di Statistica ) data.  
PATENT  Patents of the parent firm (millions Euro). 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology 
of the parent firm. 
Source: AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende, it is a 
dataset that comprises balance sheet information of more than 
200,000 Italian companies with sales lager than 500,000 Euro)  
TECH_relative  Total value of the parent firm’s technology – R&D expenditure 
+ advertising expenditure + patents - over its industry mean. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology 
of the parent firm; in particular it captures the role of 
technological leadership. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT and AIDA 
PATENT/SALES  Patent over sales of the parent firm. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology 
of the parent firm. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT and AIDA 
TELECOM  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the 
TELECOM sector, 0 otherwise. We call TELECOM the 
ATECO (NACE REV 1.1) 32 sector, characterized by 
production of TV and radio equipments. According to ISTAT, 
this is the manufacturing sector with largest R&D investments 
in Italy. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of the level of 
technology of the parent firm.  
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
METAL  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the METAL 
sector, 0 otherwise. We call METAL the ATECO (NACE REV 
1.1) 28 sector, characterized by production of metal goods. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
PRECISION  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the 
PRECISION sector, 0 otherwise. We call PRECISION the   40
ATECO (NACE REV 1.1) 33 sector, characterized by 
production of precision instruments, watches and optical 
appliances. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
SALES  Sales of the parent company (billions Euro). 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: AIDA 
HFDI  Dummy variable, 1 in case of horizontal purpose – i.e. the 
goods produced in Asia are addressed to the local market – 0 in 
case of vertical purpose – i.e. the goods produced in Asia are 
exported elsewhere. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
COUNTRIES 
Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm was engaged in 
international operations with more than 5 foreign countries 
before the FDI in Asia, 0 otherwise. It is a proxy for the firm’s 
experience in running foreign operations. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
SCALE  
Dummy variable, 1 if firm-level scale economies are important 
for the parent firm, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
VENETO 
Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm’s headquarter is located 
in Veneto, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
PRI 
Property Right Index: it scores the degree to which private 
property rights are protected and the degree to which the 
government enforces laws that protect private property. In 
addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the 
existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of 
individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges from 
1 to 5, higher values associated with less protection. 
Type: country-level regressor. 
Source: Miles et al. (2004) 
EFI 
Economic Freedom Index: it measures the degree of economic 
freedom present in five major areas - Size of Government, 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, Sound Money, 
Freedom to Trade with Foreigners, and Regulation of Credit, 
Labor, and Business. It ranges from 0 to 10, higher values 
associated to more freedom. 
Type: country-level regressor. 
Source: Gwartney et al. (2004) 
POP 
Population of the host country (millions of inhabitants). 
Type: country-level regressor. 
Source: http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/ 
TRADE 
Degree of openness of the host country, measured by 
(Import+Export)/GDP.  
Type: country-level regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from 
http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/ 
SEA 
Dummy variable, 1 if the host country belongs to the South 
East Asian region, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, 
South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore, 0 otherwise. 
Type: country-level regressor. 
Source: interviews 
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Table b2: Summary statistics of continuous variables 
 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
PATENT  356 0.6086301  2.012699  0  14.96469 
TECH_relative  344 3.936645  10.88662  0  82.71236 
PATENT/SALES  356 0.1761435  0.7417115  0  7.073824 
SALES  356 0.262313  0.8978276  0.006  6.311476 
PRI  356 3.491573  0.7817905  1  5 
EFI  349 5.834098  0.7429829  5.3  8.6 
POP  356  9.279096 5.341437 0.435389 12.98848 





Table b3: Correlation matrix of the core variables 
 
  GRADUATE TRAINING HIGHTECH PATENT TECH_relative PATENT/SALES  TELECOM 
GRADUATE 1.0000             
TRAINING 0.0794  1.0000          
HIGHTECH 0.1090  0.1141  1.0000        
PATENT 0.2276  -0.0414  0.0252  1.0000       
TECH_relative 0.1875 -0.0090 -0.1426  0.7270  1.0000     
PATENT/SALES 0.1162  -0.0112 0.1724  0.6036  0.1054  1.0000   
TELECOM 0.1516  -0.0628  0.2133  -0.0420 -0.0664  -0.0019  1.0000 
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